1. Plaintiff CODY SCOTT GARRETT, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, files this Notice to establish a record regarding his entitlement to rely on the legal treatise cited in his pleadings, and to articulate his discovery strategy in lieu of retaining an expert witness.

2. Plaintiff is an indigent pro se litigant. Plaintiff has been granted indigent status in related proceedings. Plaintiff cannot afford to retain an expert witness—a fact Defendants are well aware of, as they have already attempted to exploit Plaintiff's indigence by filing lawsuits and motions designed to chill his claims.

3. Defendants are the legal experts in this case. Plaintiff is suing licensed attorneys—Leslie Wm. Adams (licensed since 1990), William M. Irvine (licensed), Stacey L. Barnes (licensed), and Monica A. Garza-Hovel (licensed)—and their law firms. Plaintiff should not be required to hire an expert to prove malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, or unauthorized practice of law when the Defendants are the experts.

4. Texas law, which governs Plaintiff's legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims, does not require expert testimony where the negligence is within the common knowledge of laypersons. Under Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. 2004), expert testimony is not required when the alleged negligence is within the common knowledge of laypersons.

5. Arkansas law is in accord. Expert testimony is not required where the negligence is so obvious that laypersons can recognize it. See Fagan v. Dean, 2016 Ark. App. 150, 486 S.W.3d 217 (2016).

6. The conduct alleged here is so obviously wrongful that no expert is needed to explain it. The examples include, but are not limited to:

7. This conduct is so obviously wrongful that no expert is needed to explain it. Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. 2004); Fagan v. Dean, 2016 Ark. App. 150, 486 S.W.3d 217.

8. Plaintiff asserts that the legal treatise is not a substitute for an expert witness—it is the law itself. The treatise is a compilation of binding Supreme Court, Texas Supreme Court, and Arkansas Supreme Court precedent. It is self-authenticating under Federal Rule of Evidence 902 and judicially noticeable under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.

9. The treatise is a legal expert. The treatise is authored by the collective wisdom of the highest courts and legal scholars of this nation. It serves as the definitive, authoritative compilation of legal principles that govern the resolution of this case. The treatise is cited and relied upon by courts nationwide as the authoritative statement of the law.

10. The treatise cited in Plaintiff's pleadings contains the exact legal standards that govern this case. The treatise is not an opinion—it is a compilation of binding authority. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, the Court may appoint an expert to assist in understanding complex issues. Plaintiff submits that the treatise itself is the most authoritative expert available, as it is the collective wisdom of the highest courts and legal scholars. Plaintiff requests that the Court treat the treatise as the definitive statement of the law for purposes of this case.

11. The treatise applies each legal principle directly to the facts of this case. This is not a generic legal treatise—it is an integrated legal treatise that establishes the governing standards for each claim asserted and applies them directly to the specific facts of Plaintiff's case.

12. The Court does not need an expert to interpret the law—the Court is the expert on the law. Plaintiff is simply providing the Court with the authoritative sources the Court will use to decide the case.

13. Plaintiff intends to use discovery to extract the necessary testimony from Defendants themselves. Defendants are licensed attorneys. They are the legal experts. They cannot avoid giving testimony about their own conduct.

14. Plaintiff will propound discovery requests on Defendants that require them to admit to the standard of care, their deviations from it, and the consequences of those deviations. Plaintiff will ask Defendants to admit:

15. Defendants' own testimony will be used against them. Under the "admissions of a party opponent" doctrine, any statement made by a party—in discovery, deposition, or trial—is admissible as substantive evidence against that party. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (a statement made by a party in an individual or representative capacity is not hearsay).

16. Plaintiff recognizes that Defendants will likely claim attorney-client privilege and work product protection in response to discovery requests. However, the privilege does not protect facts. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) ("The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts.").

17. Plaintiff intends to ask Defendants about facts—not communications:

18. These are facts. They are not privileged. The attorney-client privilege cannot be used to shield a lawyer from admitting what they did or did not do.

19. The work product doctrine protects documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). However, it does not protect:

20. Plaintiff intends to request documents that are not work product:

24. Under Arkansas law, the attorney-client privilege does not apply when the attorney's services are sought or obtained to enable or aid the commission of a fraud or crime. Ark. R. Evid. 502(d)(1). The Eighth Circuit has applied this rule in cases involving attorney misconduct. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 23-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (crime-fraud exception applies when "the client or attorney made the communication in furtherance of a crime or fraud").

25. Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of fraud, extortion, and identity theft. The burden now shifts to Defendants to prove that their communications were not in furtherance of these crimes. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563.

26. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies only to natural persons. Corporations are not entitled to Fifth Amendment protection. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906); see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988) (collective entity doctrine).

27. A defendant cannot plead the Fifth Amendment on behalf of a third party. The Fifth Amendment privilege is personal. A defendant cannot assert the privilege to avoid testifying about the conduct of another person. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984) (the privilege is "personal" and "cannot be invoked by a third party").

28. Plaintiff's discovery strategy avoids triggering the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff does not intend to ask Defendants about any matter that could reasonably be expected to incriminate them in a criminal prosecution. Plaintiff intends to ask Defendants about the standard of care, their own conduct, and the consequences of their conduct—civil, not criminal, matters.

29. These questions do not require Defendants to admit to criminal conduct. They require Defendants to admit to professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty—civil, not criminal, matters. The privilege against self-incrimination does not protect a party from testifying to civil liability. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 668 (1998) (the Fifth Amendment "protects a person from being compelled to be a witness against himself" in a criminal case, not from being compelled to admit civil liability).

30. Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants are entitled to claim privilege and work product. However, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5), Defendants must:

31. If Defendants fail to provide a sufficient privilege log, they waive the privilege. If Defendants provide a privilege log, Plaintiff will:

32. Plaintiff may also seek in camera review of documents to determine whether the crime-fraud exception applies. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 566-67 (in camera review is appropriate when a party makes a prima facie showing of fraud).

33. Plaintiff does not seek to harass Defendants. Plaintiff seeks to obtain facts that are essential to proving his claims. If Defendants have nothing to hide, they should have no objection to producing the requested documents and answering the requested questions.

34. Plaintiff intends to use Defendants' testimony as substantive evidence at trial. Under the "admissions of a party opponent" doctrine, any statement made by a party—in discovery, deposition, or trial—is admissible as substantive evidence against that party. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).

35. Plaintiff intends to use Defendants' testimony to prove each element of his claims:

36. Plaintiff's legal treatise will serve as the framework for evaluating Defendants' testimony. The treatise establishes the legal standards. Defendants' testimony establishes the facts. The Court applies the legal standards to the facts. Plaintiff does not need an expert to do this—the Court is the expert on the law.

37. Plaintiff is indigent and has been granted indigent status in related proceedings. Plaintiff's corporate entity—JC Venture Enterprise Inc.—is insolvent and has no ability to retain counsel, let alone an expert witness.

38. Plaintiff should not be penalized for his indigence. The right of access to the courts is a fundamental right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). Access to the courts cannot be conditioned on a litigant's ability to pay. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124 (1996).

39. Requiring Plaintiff to hire an expert would effectively bar him from litigating his claims. Plaintiff cannot afford an expert. If the Court requires an expert, Plaintiff's case will be dismissed. This is precisely the outcome Defendants seek—to chill Plaintiff's claims through their own misconduct and Plaintiff's indigence.

40. Plaintiff does not need an expert witness. Plaintiff has the legal treatise—the definitive statement of the law. Plaintiff will use discovery to extract the necessary testimony from Defendants themselves—the legal experts. Defendants cannot escape liability by forcing Plaintiff to hire an expert when they are the experts.

41. Plaintiff's discovery strategy is lawful, ethical, and designed to avoid any Fifth Amendment issues. Plaintiff does not intend to ask Defendants about any matter that could reasonably be expected to incriminate them in a criminal prosecution. Plaintiff intends to ask Defendants about the standard of care, their own conduct, and the consequences of their conduct—civil, not criminal, matters.

42. Defendants are the legal experts. They will prove Plaintiff's case for him. Plaintiff will use their own admissions against them. This is not a strategy designed to harass—it is a strategy designed to obtain justice without the expense of an expert.

43. Plaintiff has considered Defendants' likely objections—attorney-client privilege, work product, and Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff has also identified the crime-fraud exception, which applies to Defendants' misconduct. Plaintiff will use procedural protections—privilege logs, motions to compel, and in camera review—to ensure that the discovery process is fair and that Defendants cannot hide behind privilege to conceal their fraud. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court permit him to proceed with this approach.